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Security: Collective Good or Commodity?1
Elke Krahman
Abstract
The state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in Europe and North America has
been central  to  the  development  of  security  as  a  collective  good.  Not  only  has  it
institutionalized the state as the prime national and international security provider, it
has helped to reduce the threat from other actors by either prohibiting or limiting their
use  of  violence.  The  recent  growth  of  the  private  security  industry  appears  to
undermine this view. Not only are private security firms proliferating at the national
level; private military companies are also taking over an increasing range of military
functions in both national defence and international interventions. This article seeks to
provide an examination of the theoretical and practical implications of the shift from
states  to  markets  in  the  provision  of  security.  Specifically,  it  discusses  how  the
conceptualization of security as a commodity rather than a collective good affects the
meaning and implementation of security in Western democracies. 
Introduction
Is security a collective good; and what are the implications if it is conceptualized as a
commodity? These are two key questions which international relations theorists have
so far neglected. Due to the perceived rise of new security threats, such as civil war,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational crime, the
study of  international  relations  has  primarily focused on the theoretical  merits  and
demerits of broadening the notion of security from states to societies and individuals,
and from military to non-military issues (Ullman, 1983: 129-153; Rothschild, 1995:
53-98; Walt, 1991: 211-239; Krause and Williams, 1997; Wæver, 1995). While this
debate does provide an important contribution to our understanding of the complex and
multifaceted nature of security, there is a third issue
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which most theorists have so  far disregarded: the shift from states to markets in the
provision of security within the transatlantic region, and the implications of this shift
for the theory and practice of security.
Many Western democracies no longer hold the monopoly on the legitimate use
of violence to protect their citizens. Instead an increasing number of profit-oriented
companies,  such  as  risk  consultancy firms,  security  firms  and military contractors,
have taken on the role of alternative suppliers of security to both citizens and states. In
the United States (US), by 2003, the number of private security guards was nearly
double the number of US police officers and was close to two-thirds the size of the US
armed forces, which is an illustration of the growing contribution of private security
providers (Parfomak, 2004).2 Private policing is not the only area of private security
expansion.  Since  the  1980s,  armed  forces  in  Europe  and  North  America  have
outsourced an increasing range of military and military support functions to private
contractors,  from  logistical  support  to  fighter  pilot  training.  The  scale  of  the
privatization of these military services has been most poignantly demonstrated by the
military intervention in Iraq where an estimated 100,000 private security and military
contractors  worked  alongside  the  international  armed  forces  in  2006,  providing  a
contingent nearly as large as that of the US military (Merle, 2006).
A  number  of  analytical  and  empirical  studies  have  investigated  the
proliferation and growing role of private security providers in the past decades (Avant,
2005;  Mandel,  2002;  Singer,  2003).  However,  so  far  there  has  been  a  lack  of
theoretical  thought  about  the  commodification  of  security  (Cutler,  2005;  Leander,
2003; Loader, 1999). Frequently, studies on the privatization of security start from the
assumption that whether states or markets provide security has few implications for its
conceptualization and implementation. They conceive of the privatization of security
as  merely  a  change  of  supplier  that  does  neither  affects  the  nature  of  the  ‘good’
security nor the state monopoly on violence. Of course, there is an important difference
between  the  state  and  the  market  provision,  which  raises  questions  of  public
accountability and transparency,  especially in the  case of  the accusation of private
security contractors of illicit practices, such as the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib.
However, these are addressed as questions of good governance and regulation. They
neglect the fundamental changes in the notion of security due to the conceptual and
practical differences between collective goods and commodities.
The aim of this article is to address this theoretical gap by investigating the
difference between collective and private goods; and how this difference affects the
definition and provision of security. There is a four-section structure to this article: the
first  section  examines  the  concept  of  security  by  investigating  the  meaning  of
‘security’ and the links between specific meanings
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and  mechanisms  for  achieving  this.  The  second  section  analyses  these  different
meanings  of  security  from a  public  goods  perspective.  Building  on  the  difference
between collective and private goods, it suggests that some meanings of security are
more  consistent  with  the  notion  of  private  than  collective  goods.  Expanding  this
argument, the third section proposes seven hypotheses about the implications of the
shift from state to market provision for contemporary security. While a test of these
hypotheses is beyond the scope of this theoretical essay, the fourth section discusses
their increasing relevance due to two developments in Europe and North America: the
exponential expansion of private security demand and the outsourcing of security and
military functions by Western states which are themselves becoming ‘consumers’ in
the private security market. The article concludes by arguing that the shift from public
to private provision of security is not merely a change of means, but has significant
implications  for  the  conceptualization  and  implementation  of  security  in  the  new
millennium.
The Concept of Security
In the 1980s the concept of security received a new attention when it was suggested
that the predominantly military definition of security that appeared to prevail among
the thinking of many European and North American academics and practitioners was
increasingly outdated (Buzan, 1991; Ullman, 1983). According to Richard Ullman, the
definition  of  security  “merely  (or  even  primarily)  in  military  terms  conveys  a
profoundly false image of reality. […] it causes states to concentrate on military threats
and ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers” (Ullman, 1983: 129). By the
end of the Cold War, a considerable number of academic and non-academic experts
had joined this argument and begun to discuss the utility of a broadened understanding
of security (Lipschutz, 1995; Krause and Williams, 1997; Paris, 2001). In particular,
they proposed two changes: widening the notion of security from state to non-state
actors and entities, such as individuals and social groups and broadening the concept of
security  from  military  to  non-military  collective  threats,  such  as  environmental
degradation and infectious diseases (Hysmans, 1998; Buzan et al., 1998; Dabelko and
Dabelko, 1993; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Gleick, 1993; Tuchman Mathews, 1989; Elbe,
2005).3 Today this broad notion of security has been widely shared among academics,
politicians, security experts and public opinion in Europe and North America, and it
forms the starting point of this article (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007a). Yet, these are
not the only issues that have been discussed with regard to the concept of security.
According  to  David  A.  Baldwin  at  least  seven  questions  shape  our  definition  of
security: security for whom, security for which values, how much security, from what
threats, by
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what  means,  at  what  cost,  and in  what  time  period (Baldwin,  1997:  13-17).  There
appears to be a link between many of the answers to these questions. For instance, a
shift from states to individuals as the object of security frequently leads to a broadened
notion  of  threat  because  individuals  appear  to  be  affected  by  different  security
concerns  than  national  borders.  Moreover,  as  this  article  contends,  the  provider  of
security crucially influences the answers to all  of these questions. However, before
turning to this issue this essay first  needs to answer another question: What do we
mean by being “secure”?
At least three distinct meanings of security can be conceptually distinguished
across  levels  of  analysis  and  different  types  of  threats.  Typically,  these  meanings
appear to be logically related to specific mechanisms for obtaining security. The first
meaning sees security as the absence of a threat.  It,  thus,  draws on a preventative
concept of security. The achievement of security is possible if a threat is non-existent
or diminished (Gleick, 1993: 80). This meaning can apply to military threats such as
war  as  much  as  to  natural  disasters.  It  can  concern  individual  security  as  well  as
national  or  international.  One  characteristic  of  the  preventative  understanding  of
security is that efforts to reduce insecurity are concerned with the causes  of a threat.
Ideally,  security  providers  can  eliminate  these  causes,  for  instance  through  the
resolution  of  political  differences  before  they erupt  into  conflict.  More  frequently,
providers can only reduce the causes of threat, for example, through attempts to limit
carbon emission in order to combat global warming. Examples of preventative security
include, at the individual level the mass killing of chicken to contain bird flu, at the
national level the establishment of social justice in order to pre-empt conflict, and at
the international level the establishment of non-proliferation regimes.
The second meaning of security refers to existing threats that are suspended in
the realm of possibility. There seems to be a link to the mechanism of deterrence with
this meaning of security. Rather than attempting to deal with, and remove the causes of
a threat,  security based on deterrence seeks to hold off  a threat from becoming an
actuality. In short, the deterrence notion of security is reactive. Since the deterrence
presumes an agent who recognizes and responds to it, this applies to human, but not
natural  threats  (Ullman,  1983:  138).  Deterrence  is  essentially  concerned  with  the
changing the perceived cost of carrying a threat out. It works by leading the agents of
threats to believe that they will fail or that the consequences, if they carry out their
planned threat, would be disastrous. Examples of deterrence proliferate across various
levels of analysis. Individuals seek security through deterrence when they keep guard
dogs or join neighbourhood watch schemes, states and international alliances try to
deter threats by engaging in highly visible military exercises or when they seek the
status of a nuclear power.
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The third meaning defines  security as  the  survival  of  a  threat  that  does  become a
reality.  This meaning of  security is  reactive in that  it  does not  concern itself  with
eliminating the causes of a threat, but, instead, with containing its consequences. The
typical concern in this understanding is the protection of the object of security from the
effects of a conflict or a disaster when they materialize. However, being reactive does
not necessarily equal being defensive. Protection against a threat can involve defensive
as well as offensive means. Individuals can gain protection from riding armoured cars
or hiring bodyguards  to shoot  in self-defence.  States can seek protection through a
National Missile Defence system or fighter planes. International alliances can fortify
their common external borders or create Rapid Reaction Forces.
Table 1. Meanings and Mechanisms of Security
Meaning of Security Mechanism of Security
Absence of a threat Prevention
Suspension of a threat Deterrence
Survival of a threat Protection
The next section will examine the distinction between these different meanings and
mechanisms, this is crucial because both vary, depending on whether the conception of
security is as a collective good or a private commodity.
Collective and Private Goods 
Before one can understand the theoretical and practical implications of the difference
between collective and private goods and its pertinence to security, it is necessary to
define  these  core  concepts.  According  to  the  theory of  public  goods,  two features
characterize a pure collective or ‘public’ good: it is non-excludable and non-rival in
consumption (Kaul et al., 1999: 3-4; Sandler, 1993: 446).
The definition of non-excludability refers to the inability to exclude a potential
user or beneficiary from a good. Non-excludable goods are those, such as fresh air, that
are free for the taking: no one can easily exclude others from using them. Conversely,
excludable goods can be restricted to a limited number of users or beneficiaries. 
The second feature,  non-rivalry,  refers to goods that  are not  diminished by
consumption or use. A non-rival good has the same benefits irrespective of whether
one or any number of people benefits from it. A lighthouse, for instance, has the same
utility irrespective of
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whether  it  guides  one  or  one  hundred  ships.  A  good  is  defined  as  rival  if  every
beneficiary or user reduces the utility of the good for others. One person using a rival
good, for instance eating a slice of bread, reduces the amount of goods available for
use by anyone else.
If these ideal type definitions are used, very few examples of ‘pure’ public
goods result. Since pure public goods should be non-excludable and non-rival, they are
limited to such things as traffic lights and environmental protection (Kaul et al., 1999:
3-4; Stretton and Orchard,  1994:  54). Another example that  is  often cited, but will
require further differentiation, is national defence (Foldvary, 1994: 8). More frequent
are  other  types  of  goods  [Table  2].  Most  goods  are  ‘private’  goods.  They  are
excludable and rival, that is, potential users can be excluded from their benefits and
consumption reduces their use. Private goods are widespread and range from food and
clothing to toys and cars. Less widespread are ‘club’ or ‘toll’ goods. Club goods are
characterized as excludable, but non-rival. In short, the benefits of club goods can be
restricted to one or several persons such as a ‘club’, but the utility of the good is not
diminished by consumption. Modern club goods include information databases, cable
television and computer programmes.  The least frequent type of goods is ‘common
pool’ goods. Common pool goods are non-excludable, but rival; everybody has free
access to them,  but  the more people use them the less there is  for others.  Typical
examples  of  common pool  goods include goods available  in  nature such as  water,
fishing and hunting.
Importantly, the labels ‘private’, ‘club’, ‘common pool’ and ‘collective’ goods
differentiate goods according to their excludability/non-excludability and rivalry/non-
rivalry. These terms must not be confused with references to their provider or the level
at which they are supplied. Private firms do not only provide ‘private’ goods, neither
do states only supply ‘public’ goods. States or other public actors can provide all types
of goods, including private goods such as electricity or transport. The fact that states
are public actors or that they may supply electricity or transport at a collective level
does not  change the inherently ‘private’,  i.e.  rival  and excludable,  character  of  the
goods  themselves.  Public  providers  can  still  exclude  citizens  from  electricity  or
transport, and consumption reduces their availability for others. Even if
Table 2. Types of Goods
Rival Non-rival
Excludable Private goods Club/Toll goods
Non-Excludable Common pool goods Collective/Public goods
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a state were to offer electricity and transport free for everybody, this would not make
these goods ‘collective’ goods according to public goods theory because, in principle,
electricity and transport remain excludable and rival. What makes a collective good is
the inability to exclude beneficiaries from its consumption, conversely, what makes a
private good is the ability to exclude them. Whether or not a particular provider does
so,  is  a separate issue.  In  short,  there is  a clear  distinction between collective and
private goods on the one hand, and public and private providers on the other.
While the definitions of goods and providers are conceptually distinct, at the
core of public goods theory is the question of what kinds of actors provide what types
of goods. Specifically, public goods theory is concerned with the problem that private
providers, defined as commercial rather than voluntary-sector actors, typically fail to
supply collective goods. According to the theory, an explanation of this behaviour by
the private market  relates to the non-excludable nature of collective goods and the
problem of free riding. Free riding occurs when consumers fail to pay for or contribute
to the provision of a non-excludable good because they can have it free. Proceeding
from the assumption that private firms want to make a profit, public goods theorists
conclude that firms have no interest in producing collective goods because nobody
would pay for them.4 Public goods theory therefore argues that public providers have
to  produce  collective  goods  because  states  or  other  public  institutions  are  able  to
overcome  the free-rider  problem by charging consumers  indirectly through general
taxation or other means.
However, how does the concept of collective goods apply to security? At first
sight, security does not seem to meet any of the criteria of a collective good. Across
levels of analysis such as the individual, national and international, security is often a
private, excludable, and frequently a rival, good or service. Firstly, not everybody has
equal  access  to  security.  It  is  excluded  from many,  for  example,  private  security
companies only protect their customers,
Table 3. Goods and Providers
Excludability Types of goods Public provision Private
(commercial)
provision
Non-excludable Collective/Public
goods
Yes No
Common pool goods Yes No
Excludable Club/Toll goods Yes Yes
Private goods Yes Yes
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gated communities provide security only to the people who live in them, states limit
their security to national citizens and international alliances only defend members. In
addition, security can be rival, i.e. the security offered to some can reduce the security
of  others.  The arming  of  private  citizens  can lead to  increased insecurity for  their
neighbours who might become alternative targets. The concentration of police forces to
protect  an international  event  such as the G8 summit  can temporarily decrease the
security in the normal deployment areas of these police forces. The security attained by
a state or an alliance by strengthening its military capabilities, decreases the security of
its  enemies.  According  to  public  goods  theory,  security  would  therefore  be  more
correctly conceived of as an inherently private good.
Why,  then,  has  security  been  regarded  a  collective  good  (e.g.  Rothschild,
1995: 60-65)? The preceding analysis of the concept of security suggests an answer. If
security is defined as the absence of threat, it appears to meet the criteria of a collective
good.  If  security is  defined in  terms  of  deterrence,  it  seems club good.  Finally,  if
security is understood as the survival of a threat, it appears to be a private good. The
following examples  elaborate why in greater  detail.  Security which is  achieved by
preventing or diminishing a threat is a collective good because it is non-excludable and
non-rival. It is not possible to exclude potential beneficiaries from the positive effects
of a reduced threat, and a growth in the number of beneficiaries does not decrease the
advantages of a prevented or diminished threat for others. Not surprisingly, during the
late 1980s some authors argued that security “mutual threat reduction” was the only
way  to  achieve  security  (Smoke,  1991:  81).  Moreover,  it  is  the  understanding  of
security as the absence of threat that has led to the argument that peace, rather than
national defence, is the archetypical collective good (Mendez, 1999). While national
defence only benefits a state and its citizens, “peace between any two parties bestows
benefits on their neighbors … even though the neighbors do not pay for the benefits
thus received” (Brauer, 2004: p. 143). Examples of preventative security include the
eradication  of  infectious  diseases  such  as  the  plague  at  the  individual  level;  the
management  of  internal  ethnic  conflicts  such  as  Belgium’s  division  between  the
Flemish and Wallonnes at the national level; and the establishment of the European
Community after the Second World War to reduce the potential of another European-
based war at the international level. All of these examples illustrate that the benefits of
preventative security are not excludable. The elimination of an infectious disease in
both an individual  or  a population decreases  its  risk for  others.  The prevention of
ethnic  conflicts  precludes  floods  of  refugees  to  neighbouring  countries.  The
pacification of Western Europe has contributed to avoidance of a Third World War.  
Conversely, security that is the result of deterrence appears to be a club good.
It is excludable, but non-rival. The provision of deterrence can be
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limited  to  a  particular  actor  or  group  of  actors  such  as  a  family,  a  state  or  an
international  alliance.  However,  the  non-rival  character  of  deterrence  means  that
additional members to these groups do not reduce its effectiveness. To illustrate, the
deterrence function of a burglar alarm does not decrease whether there are two or ten
people living in a house. The national doctrine of massive retaliation should be equally
effective for a population of 60 or 200 million; and NATO’s deterrence policy that “an
armed attack against one or more of them [i.e. the allies] in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all” has survived the enlargement of the
alliance (NATO, 1949).
Finally, security is a private good if it is the result of enhancing the abilities of
actors to survive an attack or disaster. It is excludable and rival because the defence or
protection of an individual  or  a state typically excludes others,  and because others
cannot  employ  the  same  resources  for  their  own protection.  Todd Sandler  argues,
“efforts  directed  to  thwarting  organized  crime  in  one  place  may  merely  displace
criminal  activity  to  a  less  protected  venue  so  that  benefits  are  rival  through  the
consumption process” (Sandler, 2001: 10).  At the individual level, protective security
can  range  from bulletproof  vests  to  acquiring  a  hand  weapon.  At  the  national  or
international level it subsumes such diverse measures as nuclear bomb shelters and
conventional offensive missiles.
There are always exceptions to ideal-type categorizations such as the above.
However, the preceding distinctions help to explain why security has been used as a
textbook example of a pure collective good and seem to be a private good in different
instances. More importantly, they suggest systematic differences between security that
is provided by the market or by the state. The following section builds on public goods
theory to examine these differences.
The Commodification of Security
Public  goods  theory  has  traditionally  been  most  concerned with  the  failure  of  the
market to directly supply collective or pool goods and how public providers, such as
states, can compensate for this. However, public goods theory also helps to understand
what types of goods the market  will produce without state intervention. This section
examines the relationship between the argument that private firms will only directly
supply excludable goods and the commodification of security.  What happens if the
conception  of  security  is  as  a  product  that  can  be  sold  for  profit?  The  preceding
analysis suggests at least two major implications: a change in the meaning of security
from the absence or reduction of a threat to its survival, and a focus on excludable
means of providing it, such as deterrence or protection. However, the effects of the
conceptualization  and  implementation  of  security  as  an  excludable  good  extend
further. It can be argued that the commodification
131
of  security  affects  the  answers  to  all  seven questions  that  Baldwin  identified  with
regard to the definition of security: security for whom, security for which values, how
much security, from what threats, by what means, at what cost, and in what time period
(Baldwin,  1997:  13-17).  The  following  paragraphs  consider  these  differences  and
present selected illustrations from individual, national and international levels. There is
a  growing  amount  of  empirical  evidence  to  support  the  commodification  and
marketization  of  security  in  Europe  and  North  America  and  in  international
interventions, such as in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan (Avant, 2005; Kinsey,
2006; Mandel, 2002; Singer, 2003). However, this section will draw, specifically, upon
the well-researched cases of individual and national security in the UK and the US, and
the international intervention in Iraq. While these examples do not represent a test of
the proposed hypotheses,  their main aim is to illustrate how to, possibly,  apply the
preceding theoretical argument regarding the differences between a public and private
provision of security to contemporary individual, national and international security.
Security for whom?
Firstly, it can be suggested that the commodification of security affects the answer to
the question “for whom?” because it entails the provision of security as an excludable
good. In particular,  the commodification and marketization of security are likely to
shift the focus from the collective to the individual level. Although states continue to
fund and supply collective security and there  are examples  of private  financing of
national and international security such as air safety, private security firms can expand
their markets and profits by catering to the growing demand of individual customers.
To these customers, private personalized security services might seem more effective
than  public  security  due  to  their  individual  protection.  However,  while  excludable
threat  solutions  may  improve  the  security  of  individuals,  they  can  also  decrease
security at the collective level. Thus, the growing number of private security guards
can lead to a militarization of civilian spheres, and the spread of privately owned arms
at the individual, national and international levels can promote violence. There may
also be a reduction in collective security with the redirection of resources for security
provision from public to private customers and from public to private spaces, such as
housing estates, shopping malls or oil rigs. It is unlikely that this decrease in levels of
security will concern private security providers, as this can increase the demand for
their goods and services.
In the US, the impact of the market on who is being secured is perhaps most
visible in the changing balance between private security forces and state police and
military personnel over the past few decades. A recent report for
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Congress entitled “Guarding America: Security Guards and U.S. Critical Infrastructure
Protection” noted that by 2003 the number of private security guards had risen to 1
million compared to 1.5 million US armed forces personnel and about 650,000 US
police officers (Parfomak, 2004).5 Naturally, the only charge for these private security
guards is the protection of their clients and their properties.
At  the  same  time,  the  proportion  of  military  and  security  contractors  in
international conflicts has increased from one to every fifty armed forces personnel
during the first Gulf War to almost one to one during the recent intervention in Iraq
(Avant, 2004: 153). This transformation from public to private security provision is
directly  reflected  in  security  and  defence  spending.  While  the  proportion  of  gross
national product spent on defence in the US, and other developed nations such as the
United Kingdom, France and Germany, has almost halved since 1990, the turnover of
the private security industry has nearly quadrupled in the same period.6 In short, the
commodification of security promotes a situation where the supply of security at the
individual level has increased (at least for those who can afford it), but national and
international security provision has remained steady or declined.
Security for what kinds of values?
Secondly,  there is  an argument  that  the commodification of security influences the
values  that  are  secured.  Since  commodification  and  marketization  not  only  entail
excludability,  but  also literally profit  from rivalry of  consumption,  private  security
suppliers can be expected to promote individual over collective values. Among others,
private  firms  can  do  so  by  emphasizing  the  diverse  and  even  competing  security
interests of their customers. Whereas the basis of collective security provision through
the state is on the values of inclusiveness and equality,  the marketplace encourages
individuality  and  difference.  Collective  security  requires  political  agreement  and
compromise as to what security interests and values should take priority,  while the
provision of security through the market permits citizens and companies to pursue their
particular security interests and beliefs. Where there is an increasing perception that
threats are individual rather than collective, citizens often believe that their money is
better spent on individual and private protection than on national defence. A case in
point  being  the  replacement  of  the  Cold  War  threat  with  personal  risks,  such  as
terrorism and crime,  as has been seen in Europe and North America (Kirchner and
Sperling, 2007b).
An illustration of this link, between the commodification of security and the
promotion of individual over collective values along with the perception of rivalry of
consumption, is the self-understanding of the private security industry in the US. The
American Security Industry Association (SIA) suggests
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that the ability of private security firms to cater to divergent and rival security interests
and needs is one of the key reasons for the expansion of the private security sector.
They state: “While crime rates have dropped, the random nature of crime, combined
with  competitive  process  and  built-in  convenience  features  with  security  systems,
make them attractive for purchase.”7
In  Iraq,  the  shift  from collective  to  individual  values  has  been  even more
fundamental due to the US military’s refusal to accept responsibility for public security
in the aftermath of the war. Whereas in post-World War II Germany, the allied forces
took  over  the  provision  of  public  security  within  their  respective  sectors,  the  US
Department  of  Defence  (DoD)  asserted  in  Iraq  that  it  was  only  responsible  for
safeguarding its own personnel and private contractors working directly for the DoD.
Since the dismantlement of the Iraqi armed forces and the dissolution of the police,
reconstruction companies and other US government departments were required to hire
private  security  firms  in  order  to  protect  themselves  from  attacks  against  their
employees and assets (GAO, 2005: 10.).
How much security is necessary?
Thirdly, the preceding analysis proposes that commodification and marketization are
affecting the supply and demand of security. Profit-oriented firms have an interest in
the expansion of their market, and it is to their advantage to overstate the need for
security. The growing roles of private companies in risk consulting and analysis and
hence the identification of new markets for themselves is therefore problematic. Chaim
Kaufmann’s analysis entitled “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of
Ideas” on the recent intervention in Iraq, can be reinterpreted with political competition
being replaced by market competition (Kaufmann, 2004). States play an important role
in shaping individual and public threat perception, but they do not benefit financially
from  it.  If  states  gain  politically  in  such  situations  as  Margaret  Thatcher  in  the
Falklands War and George W. Bush at the outset of the ‘war on terror,’ they typically
do so within the context of collective security (Lee, 1990). Conversely, private security
companies can generate demand and raise profits not only by identifying new threats
and  increasing  risk  perception,  but  also  by  individualizing  threat  perception  and
security provision in order to expand the number of potential customers.
The  influence  of  the  commercial  security  market  on  citizens’  fears  is
particularly strong since, unlike state agencies, the public lacks alternative sources of
information about risks when they hire private companies. The media, advertisements
and private risk consulting play a crucial part in shaping citizens’ fears, especially in
the cases of crime and terrorism. In the media’s and security firms’ views everybody is
constantly under threat (Altheide and
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Michalowski,  1999:  479-80).  As one US security company,  which offers “real  life
solutions to real business threats”, warns: 
Emergencies Hit Workplaces Every Day;
We Help You Get Ready
In the past year in the United States, there were:
4.1 million workplace injuries
2 million incidents of workplace violence
$2.6 billion of property loss from non-residential structure fires
349,500 fire department responses to hazardous material spills
45,000 natural and manmade disasters
10,000 incidents of sudden cardiac arrest at work, and
5,999 accidental workplace deaths”8
Advice is given to companies to secure their premises, and parents are urged to protect
their homes and children. Unsurprisingly, while crime rates in industrialized nations
have  mostly  fallen,  public  and  private  threat  perceptions  and  demand  for  private
security in the US and Europe have increased (U.S. Department of State, 2002; United
Nations, 2003; Briggs, 2004).
The US government’s demand for security might  be similarly influenced as
risk analysis and private security companies increasingly shape security policies. The
US government’s outsourcing of security and risk consulting has thus put private firms
in a position where they may manipulate public threat assessment and policy to create
demand  for  their  services  (Leander,  2005:  813-4).  The  case  of  the  contracting  of
Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) to evaluate the outsourcing of military logistics in the
early  1990s  and  subsequently  awarding  them  with  that  same  contract  serves  to
illustrate this argument (Spinner, 2004a). Moreover, the recent intervention in Iraq has
brought the extent to which private security companies are involved in gathering and
assessing intelligence on potential future attacks for state agencies to public attention.
The US government has a number of contracts with other private security firms for
intelligence services such as “local employed persons screening, human intelligence
support teams, open source intelligence and intelligence support management” for the
multinational  forces  in  Iraq (McCarty,  2004;  Business  Wire,  2005;  Weiner,  2004).
Given the confidentiality of their work, the impact of these firms on US public security
demand is difficult to demonstrate. However, it appears unlikely that private firms will
tell the government that the risks have decreased.
Security from what kings of threats?
Fourthly, public goods theory suggests that the private security market will focus more
on some threats than on others. In particular, private security firms are likely to offer
services that deal with individual, and therefore
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excludable,  rather  than  collective  threats.  There  thus  appears  to  be  a  link  in  the
growing attention paid to terrorism, transnational crime,  proliferation and infectious
diseases since the end of the Cold War and the commodification of security.  While
states  have  historically  been  most  concerned  with  national  security  in  terms  of
collective threats to their borders and a stable international order, the proliferation of
private security firms has resulted in increasing efforts to safeguard private and public
assets from non-state security threats.
Private security firms, for instance, have used the attacks of September 11 th as
an indicator of the growing threat of terrorism for individuals and businesses. The UK
think  tank  Demos  observes  “[t]errorism  provided  the  leverage  to  raise  security
priorities  across  the  corporate  sector.”9 US public  spending on non-traditional  and,
most importantly, excludable security threats such as terrorism and transnational crime,
is  less  easily  understandable  given  the  low  level  of  risk.  According  to  statistics
compiled by the US Department of State, the number of international terrorist incidents
has  been  decreasing  since  the  1980s  and  the  casualties  nationally  and  globally
attributable to terrorism are miniscule compared to the people annually killed in traffic
accidents (U.S. Department of State, 2003). In the year of the September 11th attacks,
4,548 people died in terrorist strikes worldwide, but in the US alone 42,643 citizens
died  in  traffic-related  incidents.10 Nevertheless,  between  1991  and  1998  the  US
National Security Strategies indicate a shift of attention away from collective threats
such as a military attack on the US or its allies, ballistic missile-strikes, an instable
Soviet Union/Russia and military “adventurism” around the globe to transnational and
individual  risks.  Among  these risks  are  “terrorism,  transnational  crime,  illicit  arms
trafficking,  uncontrolled  refugee  migrations  and  environmental  damage”  and  the
“proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies … to rogue states, terrorists and
international crime organizations” (White House, 1991; White House, 1998).
The  intervention  in  Iraq  illustrates  the  new  focus  on  non-traditional  and
individualized security threats through the presentation of the intervention as a part of
the  “war  on  terrorism”  rather  than  an  interstate  military  conflict.  One  of  the  key
objectives of the intervention was to prevent Iraq from developing nuclear weapons
and supplying them to terrorists.  Moreover, the private military and security firms,
called in to protect government personnel and contractors after the overstretched US
military  abrogated  its  responsibility  for  their  security,  directed  their  efforts  to  the
protection of private property or  personnel  from kidnappings and suicide bombers.
There were few public or private efforts to combat more widespread collective threats
such as the free availability of small arms among the Iraqi population.
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Security by what means?
Fifthly,  the commodification of security appears to entail  a change in the provision
mechanisms of security. In particular, profit-oriented security firms are more likely to
offer deterrence or protection than the prevention of threats, and they are more likely to
address security risks in terms of cost and consequences than their causes (Loader,
1999:  381-3.).  This  paper  has  already presented  an  outline  of  the  reasons for  this
behaviour  within  the  context  of  public  goods  theory.  Prevention  in  the  sense  of
combating the causes of threats provides a collective good: it is non-excludable and
non-rival.  Nobody can be excluded from benefiting from the prevention of a threat
arising and everybody benefits  equally irrespective of  the  number  of  beneficiaries.
Cynics might argue that it would be against the interests of the market to eliminate the
causes of a threat because it would prevent future profits. At a more practical level,
private companies rarely engage in prevention because it is difficult to prove that their
efforts have been successful. In a market that bases contractor fees on ‘performance’
indicators, this is a major problem. Instead, private security providers are more likely
to offer goods or services that seek to deter a threat or deal with its consequences such
as private guarding or airport security. Not only are these services excludable, but also
their performance is easier to observe and measure. 
Unfortunately, prospect theory suggests that people are more concerned about
avoiding  losses  than  improving  their  situation  (McDermott,  2004).  Individuals  are
more willing to spend money on the protection of their lives and property than to fund
efforts to reduce the origins of transnational crime and terrorism. The disposition of
people to address consequences rather than causes thus matches the characteristics of a
private security market and can lead to both reinforcing each other.
There is an increasing suggestion that protection, i.e. the most excludable form
of security provision, is the mechanism most suited to deal with the “new” security
threats.  Following  the  terrorist  attacks  in  London,  even  national  police  advised
businesses  to  upgrade  their  protection  in  order  to  safeguard  themselves,  including
“creating physical barriers near the entrance to buildings, increased security checks of
visitors and underground car parks, and restricting the number of entry points to ensure
adequate cover by security staff” (Financial Times, 2005). Similarly,  the Report for
Congress, “Guarding America”, pointed out the increasing dependence of the US on
private protection: “Federal counter-terrorism funding for critical infrastructure guards
may also present  a  policy challenge,  since 87% of  these guards  are  in  the  private
sector” (Parfomak, 2004: Summary). The types of services offered by private security
firms clearly focus on effects and excludable mechanisms of security. The SIA lists 26
market sectors, including burglar alarms,
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CCTV,  computer  security,  mobile  security,  personal  security  devices  and  outdoor
protection.11 None  of  these  sectors  refers  to  non-excludable  means  of  providing
security. 
The shift from prevention to protection in the mind-set and practices of public
and private security providers is also happening in Iraq. From the start, the US military
failed  to  engage  positively  with  the  local  population  in  order  to  prevent  further
hostilities. Instead, US armed forces personnel only left the “Green Zone” in heavily
armed convoys and with full  protective gear. As public security deteriorated within
months of the end of the war, there was an introduction of private security contractors
to safeguard US government agencies as well as the growing number of reconstruction
firms. However, because private firms were only responsible for the security of their
clients, they purely focused on protective services such as the guarding of employees,
convoys, infrastructure and military bases.
Security at what cost?
Sixthly,  the  characteristics  of  the  market  suggest  that  commodification is  likely to
affect the cost of security. One of the key arguments in favour of the privatization and
marketization of public security services has been that businesses can supply security
more cost efficiently. Where the market can generate economies of scale with saleable
products  or  security  services  for  both  private  and  public  customers  this  is  indeed
frequently the case. However, in other areas the outsourcing of public security services
can lead to increased cost (Avant, 2005: 256). In particular, where there is a lack of
competition among private firms or where public agencies fail to monitor adequately
private contractors, “profiteering” has been a problem (Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, 2007; GAO, 2006). In addition, the market’s focus on personal
security threats and protection can increase the cost of security for private customers if
compared to public security funded through taxation. Three factors play a role: firstly,
individual risks appear to be more numerous and diverse than collective threats and
private  customers  often  lack  the  expertise  to  assess  their  level  of  risk  thereby
increasing  spending  unnecessarily.  Secondly,  individual  protection  is  rival  in
consumption requiring everybody to protect themselves. Thirdly,  personally tailored
security services mean that customers cannot share the cost.
In the UK, investment in private security is four times as high as it was in
1990. Moreover, the cost of products and services for national security has typically
been increasing on average by 10 percent per year in real terms (Hartley, undated). In
1945, the UK government spent £1 million on each Lancaster bomber, whereas the
government had to pay £20 million per aircraft for its successor, the Tornado, in 1980
(Alexander and Garden,
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2001:  516).  In  comparison with the  Eurofighter  Typhoon,  which cost  £92 million,
these  aircrafts  appear  well  priced.12 The  rising  cost  of  defence  procurement  has
incidentally been one of the reasons for the pressure to obtain savings through further
outsourcing. 
A  large  proportion  of  these  market  price  increases  appears  to  be  due  to
growing demand and limited competition. In Iraq, however, there have been a number
of accusations about prime security contractors over their having attempted to enlarge
their profits through improper accounting, subcontracting and overcharging (Spinner
and  Flaherty,  2004).13 The  best-publicized  case  has  been  that  of  Halliburton’s
subsidiary KBR that continues to provide most of the logistical support for US military
interventions  under  the  LOGCAP  contract.  Among  others,  KBR  was  accused  of
overcharging the DoD in the region of $149 million for fuel and meals (Reuters, 2004;
The  Associated  Press,  2004;  GAO,  2004).14 Pentagon  auditors  who  selectively
reviewed a range of contracts found that in twenty-two out of twenty-four cases the
“DOD cannot be assured that it was either provided the best contracting solution or
paid fair and reasonable prices for the goods and services purchased” (Spinner, 2004b).
While private military contracting for international interventions may be particularly
difficult, these problems highlight the fact that private, unlike public, providers seek to
make a profit.
Security in what time period?
Finally, it can be argued that commodification and marketization affect the period in
which security is provided. In particular, the market is likely to offer only short-term
security because it  fails  to address the causes of a threat.  In addition,  research has
shown  that  threats  like  terrorism  and  transnational  crime  quickly  adapt  to
individualized security measures such as personnel and site protection and find ways of
undermining  them.  For  the  market,  this  is  an  advantage  because  protective
technologies  and  strategies,  such  as  alarm  systems,  are  soon  outdated  and  need
replacing. Other services such as body and site guarding need constant provision in
order to be effective. The focus on excludable security thus helps to ensure constant
demand.
The resulting long-term dependency on private security is attested by statistics
establishing that more than half of all security guards in the US work for their own
company.15 Moreover,  since  terrorists  and  criminals  learn  to  avoid  and  undermine
established  protective  measures,  new  technologies  and  mechanisms  are  constantly
required to maintain current levels of individual or national security. Advertisements
and  security  sector  showcases  promote  these  new  products,  and  there  are  regular
information services provided to public and private costumers about new developments
in the security industry.16
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In Iraq, the persistent instability of the country is a demonstration of the short-term
nature of private security.  Efforts have been made to build-up and train new public
police and armed forces (incidentally with the help of private security companies) in
order to improve public security;  but these programs have, to date, proceeded only
slowly.  Instead  of  investing  earlier  into  Iraqi  self-government,  the  Government
Accountability Office reports that large sums of money were wasted on commercial
security which only offered temporary protection. Moreover, with the withdrawal of
the US armed forces from the country, the demand for private security companies is set
to increase.
Security, the State and the Market
While a theoretically grounded understanding of the differences between the public
and private provision of security seems to be worthwhile in itself, this section contends
that  two developments  are  increasing  the  relevance  for  the  analysis  of  security  in
contemporary Europe and North America. The first is the growing private demand for
and spending on commercial  security services  which outstrip that  of  states and go
hand-in-hand with decreased trust in public security provision. The second is the fact
that states are turning into consumers of private security themselves by buying existing
security products and services in the search for greater cost efficiency and relying on
private firms for threat analysis and policy implementation.
An analysis of the reasons for this growing role of the market in the provision
of  individual,  national  and  international  security  in  Europe  and  North  America  is
beyond the aims and scope of this article. However, a mixture of factors have been
identified in the literature ranging from perceived changes in the nature of security
threats and distrust in the effectiveness of public security provision on the one hand, to
the  rise  of  the  neoliberal  doctrine  of  the  “small  state”  and  belief  in  the  superior
efficiency of the market  on the other (Krahmann, 2005a). The impact of these two
developments  is  of  concern for  this  article.  While states and other public  agencies
continue  to  address  the  imperfections  of  the  market  for  security  at  the  individual,
national  and  international  levels,  the  balance  between  public  and  private  security
providers is changing. Today,  private firms directly supply the larger proportion of
individual security and their role in national and international security is increasing.
Extensive studies of private security and policing demonstrate that the private
demand  for  security  services  has  been  expanding  since  the  1970s  (South,  1988;
Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Johnston, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 1998). In much of
Europe and North  America,  private  protection has  become  the  norm in  previously
public areas such as shopping malls, 
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housing estates and parks as well as private property. In 1999, US spending on private
security was 73 percent higher than for public law enforcement, and private security
officers  outnumbered  public  police  in  the  region  of  three  to  one  (Altheide  and
Michalowski, 1999: 481). Moreover, since the end of the Cold War era there has been
a growing demand for individual and corporate security abroad (Jones and Newburn,
1998: 95-97; Johnston, 2000: 24). Multinational corporations rely on private security
as globalization and the search for scarce natural resources and cheap labor encourages
them to operate in volatile countries (Mandel, 2002: 20-2; Singer, 2003: 80-2). Finally,
there is increasing use of private security by Western non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that are implementing or replacing state aid in conflict regions (Lilly, 2000:
17-9; Spearin, 2005). Where states are reluctant to intervene for humanitarian purposes
and have been outsourcing national aid to NGOs, these agencies look to the market for
protection. As a result, private citizens and businesses currently make up between 70
and  90  percent  of  the  contracts  of  internationally  operating  private  military  and
security companies.17 While citizens in Europe and North America have supported cuts
in their security and defence budgets, the turnover of these companies has quadrupled
since 1990. 
The  perceived  upsurge  in  non-state  security  threats  such  as  terrorism,
transnational crime and proliferation has fostered the impression that security can be
better achieved by individual rather than collective measures. Moreover, these threats
have contributed to  undermining  the notion that  states  are  capable  of  ensuring the
security  of  their  citizens.  The  deterritorialized  nature  of  these  threats  and  the
ineffectiveness of collective deterrence mean that national police and security forces
appear to have become overstretched, and therefore their services have become rival,
because  security  personnel  are  concentrated  around  the  most  likely  targets  at  the
neglect of others. The recommendation of the British police that businesses should hire
private companies to protect themselves against the threat of terrorism, seems to be a
public admission of the failure of state-provided security. Whereas it could be noted
that the refusal of the US military to ensure public security in occupied Iraq and the
unwillingness  to  intervene  in  Darfur  were  abdications  of  state  responsibility  for
international security. The market is expanding to fill these gaps. It is providing the
majority  of  domestic  security  in  Europe  and  North  America,  and  firms  such  as
Blackwater have already offered their services for international peacekeeping. 
However, the increasing relevance of investigations into the distinctiveness of
private security is not limited to the growing scope of private market provision. The
market also progressively shapes the security provided by the state and other public
agencies due to the outsourcing of an increasing range of military and security services
to private companies. States are themselves
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becoming consumers in the private security marketplace. The US and the UK were
among the first countries to purchase not only military technology, but also security-
related services from the private sector (Edmunds, 1998). Since then the number of
countries to do so, and the range of military and security services offered by private
companies has expanded every year. In North America and Europe, Canada, Germany,
Italy,  and France have begun to privatize military and security services (Krahmann,
2005b).
Crucially,  whereas  during the Cold War  private  armaments  companies  and
security firms supplied states with customized products and services, current efforts to
reduce  national  security  and  defence  spending  through  outsourcing  are  based  on
buying existing products.  “Economies  of  scale  are the ‘holy grail  of  outsourcing’”
(Anderson et al., 2001: 6-12). Goods and services developed for the private market
therefore influence public security provision. The US and UK governments see private
firms as innovation leaders and believe that the commercial market is better able to
develop  new solutions  to  existing  security  problems  than  the  military.  During  the
Nineteenth and first half of the Twentieth centuries state-owned military research and
production  facilities  drove  advances  in  technological  inventions.  Today,  there  is  a
perception that private industry and services are more advanced (Anderson at al., 2001,
6-5).  Examples  of  commercial  technologies  and  services  shaping  national  defence
include, the use of management systems developed by WALMART for US defence
logistics, the utilization of commercial tracking technology to monitor the movement
of  US  troops  in  the  Iraq  War  and  the  adaptation  of  banking  software  for  risk
assessment in the ‘war on terror.’
Since the range of services and functions bought from private security and
military companies is expanding, so is the potential impact of the market on public
security  provision.  While,  initially,  only  civilian  support  tasks  such  as  housing
management  and  water  treatment  were  privatized  by  the  armed  forces,  today  the
services  supplied by private  military and security firms  for  state  customers  are  all
encompassing.  They  include  military  risk  consulting,  intelligence  gathering,
maintenance, training and logistical support (Mandel, 2002: 93-107; Singer, 2003: 92-
100). Combat remains the last task exclusive to the armed forces, but some private
military companies have already offered their services for international interventions
(Witter, 2006). In particular, private military and security companies play a growing
role  in  the  identification  of  security  threats  and  the  evaluation  of  different  policy
options. It is now, frequently, routine to hire private companies for risk assessment and
policy analysis, often with beneficial outcomes for the companies themselves in terms
of future contracts (Spinner, 2004a). 
While  the  influence  of  the  market  and  specific  companies  on  the  public
provision of security might be tempered by states own resources and expertise, cuts in
military personnel over the past decades across Europe and North
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America have significantly reduced the armed forces’ ability to assess the  policies
developed by private companies  and to monitor their  implementation (GAO, 2006;
Avant, 2005: 58). As Peter W. Singer argues, “client dependency grows each time they
outsource or privatize functions” (Singer, 2003: 78). In fact, one of the principles of
the new public management practices which were introduced alongside the outsourcing
of military and security functions in the 1990s was to give private security contractors
more freedom in how they implemented government contracts in order to encourage
innovation and cost-efficiency.
The fact that European and North American states remain key providers of
public security, only partially mitigates the effects of the market. As soon as states buy
security services from private companies, the commodification of security is likely to
have an influence on the equipment and policy choices (Avant, 2005: 48). At a general
level,  the market  can shape state security policies by making or offering particular
goods and services. At a more specific level, the employment of private contractors in
positions involved in the definition and assessment of threats and policies allows them
to influence public security policies. 
Conclusion
The state monopoly on violence and the public-goods character of security have been
core  assumptions  for  individual,  national  and  international  security.  Both  have
increasingly been questioned in the new millennium. States are outsourcing an ever-
expanding range of military and security functions to private contractors, and rising
private demand for security services is contributing to a boom of the private security
sector.  Nevertheless,  there  is  little  theoretical  research  on  the  implications  of  the
difference between security that is conceived of as a collective good and a commodity.
The neglect of this issue in international relations theory appears based on the implicit
assumption  that  there  is  little  difference  whether  the  state  or  the  market  provides
security. Indeed, in the US and the UK the prevalent political view appears to be that
the market  is more responsive to and more efficient  in satisfying the demands and
needs of the public than the state.
This article has sought to present a critical analysis of the provision of security
by the private market.  Using public goods theory,  it has argued that security is not
always a collective good, i.e. it is not always non-excludable and non-rival. It rather
depends  on  the  definition  of  security  and  the  mechanisms  used  to  achieve  it.  In
particular, this article has distinguished three forms of security: prevention, deterrence
and protection. While prevention appears to be a non-excludable and non-rival form of
security,  deterrence  is  typically  excludable  and  non-rival,  and  protection  is  both
excludable and rival. 
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Crucially,  public  goods  theory  argues  that  the  market  will  under  provide  non-
excludable goods because of a free-rider problem. The market is therefore more likely
to  provide  excludable  forms  of  security  such  as  protection  or  deterrence  than
prevention.  Moreover,  the  production  of  security  as  a  commodity  influences  who
acquires it, what threats are addressed, how much security will cost and whether it is
long-term or short-term.  The theoretical and practical implications of the preceding
analysis  are  far  ranging.  This  analysis  suggests  that  the  meaning and provision  of
security in all its dimensions is greatly influenced by the choice of market or state as
the ultimate provider.
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